OPINION TO THE AFRICAN DEMOCRATIC CONGRESS (ADC) — RE: FHC/ABJ/CS/2637/2025 AND THE JUDGMENT OF LIFU, J. DELIVERED 15 JUNE 2026
BY SENATOR DINO MELAYE ESQ.
The judgment delivered by Justice Peter Lifu on 15 June 2026, directing INEC to deregister ADC, Accord Party, Action Alliance, Action Peoples Party and Zenith Labour Party, and barring them from the 2027 general election is voidable. Based on the facts available, including media reports confirming the existence of a Court of Appeal Stay of Proceedings Order dated 22 May 2026 in CA/ABJ/CV/569/2026, and INEC’s own Counter-Affidavit denying any constitutional breach by ADC, my opinion is that the judgment is vulnerable on at least four independent fronts: jurisdictional nullity, the merits of Section 225A itself, the evidentiary weight of INEC’s own admission, and the proper limits of mandamus over a discretionary power. ADC has strong grounds to resist the judgment and should move urgently, in the appeal already pending, rather than wait passively for the October hearing date.
1. The judgment is voidable as having been delivered in defiance of a subsisting order of a superior court
The Court of Appeal panel (Danjuma, Banjoko and Oyewumi, JCA), by an enrolled order dated 22 May 2026, stayed “further proceedings” in FHC/ABJ/CS/2637/2025 pending determination of the appeal, and fixed the appeal for hearing on 27 October 2026. The delivery of substantive judgment on 15 June 2026, disposing of the entire suit and granting all the reliefs sought, is unambiguously “further proceedings” within the contemplation of that order. It is irrelevant whether the trial judge believed the stay was wrongly granted, or that an application to discharge it was pending; until actually set aside, the order remained binding and had to be obeyed. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that an order of court, right or wrong, must be obeyed until set aside, and that no party, least of all a court, may engage in self-help by ignoring it. See NDAYAKO V. DANTORO (2004) 13 NWLR (Pt. 889) 187, where thew Supreme Court stated the position of the law as follows:
A party who knows of an order, whether null or void, regular or irregular, cannot be permitted to disobey it. It would be most dangerous to hold that the suitors or their solicitors, could themselves judge whether an order was null or valid whether it was regular or irregular. That they should come to the court and not take upon themselves to determine such a question. (P.568, paras. B-E)
The Supreme Court further stated in KANAWA V. I.N.E.C. (2022) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1812) 393, as follows:
The question of reviewing the decision of the Supreme Court or any superior court does not arise for that will amount to a gross judicial impertinence for an inferior court to review, or attempt to review, or outrightly vary the decision of a superior court it is obligated to follow without an option whether he thinks the judgment is right or wrong. [Dalhatu v. Turaki (2003) 15 NWLR (Pt. 843) 310 referred to.] (P. 417, paras. A-B)
A court that proceeds to determine a matter while validly divested of competence to do so by a subsisting order of a superior court acts without jurisdiction, and “a proceeding conducted without jurisdiction is a nullity however well conducted and brilliantly decided” (MADUKOLU V. NKEMDILIM (1962) 2 SCNLR 341). This is not a hypothetical argument in the present political climate: the apex court’s recent intervention setting aside steps taken in the PDP national convention dispute earlier this year, precisely on the footing that acts taken in defiance of a subsisting court order cannot stand, is a fresh and directly analogous precedent that ADC’s counsel should draw the Court of Appeal’s attention to.
2. On the merits, ADC does not fall within the class of parties Section 225A was designed to remove
Section 225A (inserted by the Fourth Alteration Act No. 9, 2017) empowers INEC to deregister a party for
a) breach of registration requirements, and, cumulatively,
b) failure to secure at least 25% of votes cast in one state in a presidential election or one local government in a governorship election, and
c) failure to win at least one ward in a chairmanship election, one seat in the National Assembly or a State House of Assembly, or one councillorship seat.
Limbs (b) and (c) operate conjunctively: a party escapes deregistration if it satisfies either the vote-threshold limb or the seat-winning limb. ADC’s verified return of two House of Representatives seats and three State House of Assembly seats in 2023 squarely satisfies limb (c)(ii), independent of how the party performed against the 25% threshold. This is consistent with how INEC and the courts have historically applied the section, the 74-party mass deregistration upheld by the Supreme Court in 2021–2022 (National Unity Party (NUP) v. Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) (2021) LPELR-56694(SC),) involved parties that had won nothing at any tier of government whatsoever. ADC’s case is materially different on its face, and the trial court’s finding that ADC “failed to meet performance thresholds” is difficult to reconcile with the constitutional text once the seats actually won are placed before the court.
3. INEC’s own Counter-Affidavit undermines the foundation of the judgment
- Advertisement -
INEC, as the body constitutionally vested with the exclusive power to assess and act on Section 225A, filed a Counter-Affidavit stating that ADC and the other parties had not breached any constitutional provision warranting deregistration. It is a settled evidentiary principle that depositions in an affidavit which are not specifically controverted are ordinarily deemed admitted, and a court does not lightly substitute its own contrary finding of fact for the unchallenged position of the regulator with custody of the relevant electoral data. That INEC, the nominal first defendant and the only party with the statutory mandate and the records to make this determination, disagreed with the plaintiff’s central factual premise is a significant point that should be foregrounded on appeal.
4. The relief granted may exceed the proper scope of mandamus over a discretionary power
Section 225A is framed in permissive terms (“the Commission shall have power to deregister”), not mandatory terms. A court asked to compel performance of a statutory duty can ordinarily order a public body to consider and exercise its discretion lawfully; it is a more contestable proposition for the court itself to dictate the substantive outcome of that discretion, particularly where the body itself denies the factual predicate for exercising it adversely. This is a secondary but reinforcing argument for the appellate panel.
RECOMMENDED COURSE OF ACTION
Given the timelines (party primaries and the 2027 cycle approaching, and the substantive appeal not listed until 27 October), ADC should not wait for the ordinary appeal date. I recommend, in order of urgency:
First, obtain the certified true copy of both the 15 June judgment and the 22 May enrolled order without delay, since the entire nullity argument turns on the precise wording of the stay and the precise date/sequence of the judgment’s delivery.
Second, file an urgent motion within the pending appeal (CA/ABJ/CV/569/2026) for an order declaring the 15 June judgment null, void and of no effect as having been delivered in breach of the Court of Appeal’s own subsisting order, alongside (or in the alternative) an application for accelerated hearing of the substantive appeal.
Third, as a protective measure, file a fresh notice of appeal against the substantive judgment on the merits, the conjunctive reading of Section 225A, ADC’s seats won, and INEC’s Counter-Affidavit, so that ADC is not left exposed if the nullity argument alone does not succeed.
Fourth, write formally to INEC and the AGF putting them on notice that compliance with the 15 June judgment while the Court of Appeal’s stay subsists would itself be a step taken in defiance of a superior court’s order, exposing those who act on it to contempt liability, this gives INEC a documented basis to hold its hand pending the appeal.
Finally, coordinate, where positions align, with Accord, Action Alliance, APP and ZLP, who are co-respondents to the same stay order and the same judgment; a joint or aligned appellate position (ZLP’s own claim of having exceeded the threshold by winning fifteen local governments is useful comparative material) will carry more weight than five separates, possibly inconsistent, applications.
This legal opinion is built on the publicly reported terms of the judgment and the stay order rather than the certified court record.
(DEMOCRACY NEWSLINE NEWSPAPER, JUNE 16TH 2026)
